Abstract:
This paper develops and estimates a searchmodel of the labor market where jobs are characterized by wages and work-hoursflexibility. Flexibility is valued by workers, and is costly to provide foremployers. The model generates observed wage distributions directly related tothe preference for flexibility parameters: the higher the preference forflexibility, the wider is the support of the wage distribution at flexible jobsand the larger is the discontinuity between the wage distribution at flexibleand non-flexible jobs. Estimation results show that more than one third ofwomen place positive value to flexibility, with women with a college degreevaluing flexibility more than women with a high school degree. Counterfactualexperiments show that flexibility has a substantial impact on the wagedistribution but not on the unemployment rate. We comment on the implicationsof our approach for gender differential in wages and schooling.
JEL:J30; C5
Keywords
| “Household Search or Individual Search: Does it Matter? Evidence from Lifetime Inequality Estimates.” (with J. Mabli) | Work in Progress, 2010 |
Abstract:
The standard study of earnings inequality builds inequality indexesbased on a cross-section of individual earnings. While this information isuseful, it only offers an incomplete picture of the extent and the impact ofinequality. First, it ignores that individuals may move between differentpoints of the cross-sectional earnings distribution over the course of theirlife. Second, it ignores that most individuals live in households that poolresources.
Inthis paper we attempt to remove these two limitations by developing andestimating a household search model of the labor market. This procedure allowsus to build lifetime inequality measures taking into account earnings mobilityacross the cross-sectional distribution over time and to construct inequalitymeasures at the household level and not only at the individual level. Inallowing for household search we also provide a contribution to the labormarket search literature since the overwhelming majority of estimated searchmodels ignores the existence of the household as a crucial unit of labor marketdecisions.
Weestimate the model on the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP)since it provides accurate information about the determinants of the income ofindividual households in the
| "Sources of Earnings Inequality: Estimates from an On-the-Job Search Model of the | European Economic Review, 54(6): 832-854, 2010 |
Abstract:
Since the early 1980s the labor market inthe
Keywords: Earnings Inequality; EarningsInstability; On-the-job search; Structural estimation
JEL Nos: J21, J31
| "Gender Discrimination Estimation in a Search Model with Matching and Bargaining" | International Economic Review, 51(3): 745-783, August, 2010 |
Abstract:
Gender wage differentials, conditional onobserved productivity characteristics, have been considered a possible indicationof prejudice against women in the labor market. However, there is no conclusiveevidence on whether these differentials are due to labor market discriminationor to unobserved productivity differences. The objective of this paper is topropose a solution for this identification problem by developing and estimatinga search model of the labor market with matching, bargaining and employers'taste discrimination. In equilibrium all types of employers wage discriminatewomen: prejudiced employers because of preference and unprejudiced employersbecause of spillover effects that worsen the bargaining position of women.Estimation is performed by maximum likelihood on Current Population Survey datafor the year 1995. Results indicate that the productivity of women is 6.5%lower than the productivity of men and that about half of the employers areprejudiced against women. Three policy experiments are implemented using theestimated parameters: an equal pay policy, an affirmative action policy and awage differential decomposition that takes into account equilibrium effects.
JEL:C51; J7; J64
Keywords
| "Intergenerational Mobility and Schooling Decisions" | IZA Discussion Paper 2876, 2007 (with D. Checchi) |
Abstract:
Intergenerational mobility in income andeducation is affected by the influence of parents on children's school choices.Our focus is on the role played by different school systems in reducing ormagnifying the impact of parents on children's school choices and therefore onintergenerational mobility in general. We compare two apparently similareducational systems,
| "Prejudice and Gender Differentials in the | Journal of Econometrics, , 156, 190-200, 2010 |
Abstract:
Earnings differentials between men and womenhave experienced a stable convergence during the 1980s, following a processstarted in the late 1970s. However, in the 1990s the convergence has almoststopped. The first objective of the paper is to evaluate if discrimination,defined as explicit prejudice, may have a role in explaining this slowdown in
| ''Returns to Education in the Economic Transition: A Systematic Assessment Using Comparable Data'' (with S. Paternostro and | Economics of Education Review, 27, 724-740, 2008 |
Abstract:
Thispaper studies a sample of economies in transition to verify the assertion thatreturns to schooling increase as an economy transitions to a marketenvironment. This claim has been difficult to assess in the past as theempirical evidence so far has covered only a few countries over short timeperiods. A number of studies find that returns to education increased from the“pre-transition” period to the “early transition” period; it is not clear whathas happened to the skills premium through the late 1990s, or the periodthereafter. We implement a more systematic analysis using data comparableacross countries and over time to estimate returns to schooling in eighttransition economies (
JEL: J31, P23
Keywords: returns toschooling, transition economies
| Work in Progress, 2004 |
Abstract:
Becker's [1971] model of tastediscrimination has been very influential but also strongly criticized because,as Arrow [1973] put it, the ``model predicts the absence of the phenomenon itwas designed to explain.'' The issue is that only the least discriminatoryemployers survive in the long run, eventually leading to the disappearance ofdiscrimination. Recently, labor market models with search frictions havestarted to be used to address this problem. The objective of this paper is toshow if prejudiced and unprejudiced employers can both survive in a labormarket with search friction, matching, bargaining and free-entry of employers.Two types of modelling strategies may generate outcomes in which differenttypes of employers survive. In the first, employers are ex-ante homogenous andthe disutility from hiring women is match specific. Inthe second, workers direct search toward prejudiced or unprejudiced employers,then are randomly matched to employers within the specific type chosen.
| ''Productivity, Seniority, and Wages: new evidence from personnel data'' (with A. Ichino) | Labour Economics, 8, 359-387, 2001 |
Abstract:
Wages may be observed to increase with seniority becauseof firm-specific human capital accumulation or because of self-selection ofbetter workers in longer jobs. In both these cases the upward sloping wageprofile in cross sectional regressions would reflect higher productivity ofmore senior workers. If this were true, the observation of an effect ofseniority on wages would depend on the presence of controls for individualproductivity. In this paper we replicate, using personnel data from a largeItalian firm, the results of the pioneering work of Medoff and Abraham (1980and 1981) in which supervisors' evaluations were used as productivityindicators. Since the validity of supervisors' evaluations as measures ofproductivity has been widely criticised, we extend the work of Medoff andAbraham using different direct measures of productivity based on recordedabsenteeism and misconduct episodes. Both these indicators and supervisors'evaluation suggest that the observed effect of seniority on wages does notreflect a higher productivity of more senior workers. Only at the lowest levelsof the firm's hierarchy, the human capital theory contributes to explain theeffect of seniority on wages. At least at all other levels, the explanation ofthe observed upward sloping profile has to be based on theories in which wagesare deferred for incentive or insurance reasons.
| "The Transmission Mechanism of Monetary Policy in Europe: Evidence from Banks' Balance Sheets" (with | NBER Working Paper, W7231, July, 1999 |
Abstract:
Available studies on asymmetries in the monetarytransmission mechanism within
| "Returns to Schooling in | |
Abstract:
The conventional wisdom inthe literature is that OLS estimates of returns to schooling are biased andinconsistent due to endogeneity in the schooling variable (Griliches 1977). Arecent solution to this endogeneity problem has been found in identifyingexogenous sources of variation in schooling to build a new set of instrumentalvariables for years of education attained (Angrist and Krueger 1991; Card1998).
The aim of this paper isto apply new instrumental variables estimation to Italian data using the Bankof Italy data set Indagine sui bilancidella famiglie nell’anno 1991. IVestimation results suggest a downward bias in OLS estimates. Moreover theextent of the bias is asymmetric in regard to gender: OLS estimates indicatethe usual hierarchy - i.e. female returns higher than male returns (Lucifora1994; Blau-Kahn 1992) - whereas IV estimates suggest an opposite hierarchy inthe point estimates.
JEL
Keywords
In Italian:
| Rivista di Politica Economica, 7/8, 2001 |
Abstract:
The objective of this paper is to evaluatethe determinants of Secondary Schooling choices for young Italians, focusing inparticular on the impact of family background. The problem is relevant becauseSecondary schooling in
| ''Dieci anni di contrattazione aziendale in Lombardia: 1986-1995'' (with D. Checchi) | Lavoro e Relazioni Industriali, 2, 1999 |
Abstract:
Dopo gli accordi del Luglio 1992 e 1993 il tema della struttura dellacontrattazione in Italia ha ricevuto molta attenzione come uno dei possibilistrumenti di controllo della dinamica salariale. Tuttavia è carente laconoscenza degli effettivi meccanismi che conducono alla stipulazione diaccordi tra le controparti. In questo lavoro ci proponiamo di utilizzare i datia nostra disposizione per indagare il processo negoziale tra impresa, sindacatoe lavoratori a livello aziendale. Per questo abbiamo scelto di sintetizzare levariabili relative al contesto e alle modalità di relazione tra le parti, perpoi cercare di predire i risultati del processo negoziale tramite questiindicatori. Interessante è valutare se questi indicatori possano costituire unadeterminante complementare o alternativa a quella in genere sottolineata inletteratura, tipicamente la dimensione d’impresa.