

Elections through the Lens of News Media Trust

Jonathan McDonald Ladd
Assistant Professor
Public Policy Institute and
Department of Government
Georgetown University
jml89@georgetown.edu

August 2008

Acknowledgements:

A previous version of this paper received the Westview Press Award for the best paper presented by a graduate student at the 2005 Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association. I thank Doug Arnold, Larry Bartels, Martin Gilens, Erika King, Gabriel Lenz, Skip Lupia, Tali Mendelberg and seminar participants at the University of Delaware, George Washington University, Georgetown University, Princeton University and Temple University for helpful comments on earlier versions. All remaining errors are my own.

Abstract

As an institution, the news media in the United States have become highly unpopular. Yet, we know little about the consequences of this unpopularity for American politics. Using a variety of datasets, his paper examines the effect of attitudes toward the news media on voter decision-making. It finds that those with negative attitudes toward the press base their votes more on partisan predispositions and less on contemporary messages. Declining confidence in the institutional press can account for 48% of the increase in partisan voting over the past 40 years. Distrust of the media appears to be an important source of polarization in the American political system.

1 Introduction

The news media play a central role in modern democracies. In these nations, citizens rely on the media for information about the content and consequences of the actions of elected leaders. As Lippmann (1997 [1922], 53) puts it,

Each of us lives and works on a small part of the earth's surface, moves in a small circle, and of these acquaintances knows only a few intimately. Of any public event that has wide effects we see at best only a phase and an aspect... Inevitably our opinions cover a bigger space, a longer reach of time, a greater number of things, than we can directly observe. They have, therefore, to be pieced together out of what others have reported and what we can imagine.

While earlier research was more skeptical (e.g. Klapper 1960; Patterson and McClure 1976), studies in recent decades have documented the strong influence of mass media on the public's beliefs and opinions. The power of media messages to shape people's views of the world seems more "massive" than "minimal" (Bartels 1993; DellaVigna and Kaplan 2007; Druckman and Parkin 2005; Gabel and Scheve 2007; Gerber, Karlan, and Bergan 2006; Graber 2006, 2007; Hetherington 1996; Kahn and Kenney 2002; Kinder 1998a, 1998b, 2003; Mutz 1998; Zaller 1992, 1996). In Petrocik's (1995, 136) words,

The press is consequential because voters need information about candidates in order to make a choice that corresponds to their preferences. Limits on what a person can know and experience make the press the source of that information for most of us.

Yet, as one stream of research documents the persuasive power of the news media, the more general literature examining the psychology of persuasion emphasizes the central role of source credibility in the process (Druckman and Lupia 2000). While scholars across political science, economics and psychology have active research interests in persuasion and have developed several distinct models of the process, almost all agree that when the persuader is trustworthy (or has attributes signaling trustworthiness) persuasion is more likely to occur (Chaiken 1980; Crawford

and Sobel 1982; Eagly and Chaiken 1993; Lupia 1994; Lupia and McCubbins 1998; McGuire 1969; Petty and Cacioppo 1986; Popkin 1991; Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991; Zaller 1992).¹

These two largely distinct literatures focusing on source credibility and news media persuasion lead one to wonder whether the extent of the media's influence depends on the public's attitudes toward them. This question is especially salient because public opinion toward the press has changed dramatically over the past four decades. It is difficult to detect trends in opinion toward the media before the early 1970s because, while commercial survey firms did sometimes ask relevant questions, no wording was used consistently over time (Erskine 1970-1971). Since 1973, however, the General Social Survey (GSS) has included an item probing *Confidence in the Press* in the battery of questions measuring confidence in American institutions included in its frequent national surveys.² Confidence in the Press declined dramatically over this period.³ As Figure 1 shows, in 1973, Confidence in the Press was reasonably high regardless of partisanship and very similar to that of other institutions.⁴ Since then, public opinion toward the press has become dramatically more negative. By the 1998 GSS survey, Confidence in the Press was lower than for any other institution in the battery (Cook and Gronke 2001; Cook, Gronke, and Rattliff 2000;

¹ "Dual-process" theories in psychology are possible exceptions, claiming that source credibility is only important when people lack the desire or ability to analyze the content of the message (Chaiken 1980; Eagly and Chaiken 1993; Petty and Cacioppo 1986). However, Zaller (1992, 46-47) argues convincingly that, in the context of modern American politics, virtually the entire population is neither involved nor interested enough by the standards of Chaiken and Petty and Cacioppo's experiments to eschew source heuristics (see Converse 1964; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Kinder 1998a, 1998b; Lippmann 1997 [1922]).

² For more details on the General Social Survey, see <http://www.norc.uchicago.edu/projects/gensoc.asp>. The GSS data and codebooks with question wordings are archived at the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research and available at <http://webapp.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/ICPSR-STUDY/04295.xml>.

³ The news media as an institution is not as concrete an "attitude object" (Eagly and Chaiken 1993, 1) as a specific media outlet, leading to the concern that it may have little meaning to most people. A related concern is that some people may associate the word "press" only with printed media. Ladd (2006b) addresses this issue using open-ended "stop and think" style questions (Zaller 1992; Zaller and Feldman 1992) to examine the "considerations" brought to mind by questions probing "trust" or "confidence" in the "press" or the "media," finding different question wordings prompt very similar responses.

⁴ Here and throughout this paper, I code all variables to range from 0 to 1, as advised by Achen (1982). To achieve this, all variables are divided by their maximum values except Age, which is divided by 100. Party Identification and Vote Choice are coded so that higher values indicate identification with, or a vote for, the Republican Party, except in Table 4, where these variables are coded so that 1 indicates identification with, or a vote for, the incumbent party.

Gronke and Cook 2002, 2007). Confidence in the Press in the 2006 survey, as shown in Figure 1, is lower than that of all other institutions except television and only somewhat higher among Democrats than Republicans.⁵ Fineman (2005) laments that, "...the notion of a neutral, non-partisan mainstream press was, to me at least, worth holding onto. Now it's pretty much dead, at least as the public sees things...It's hard to know now who, if anyone, in the 'media' has any credibility."

While several existing studies examine the causes of negative attitudes toward the news media (Bennett, Rhine, and Flickinger 2001; Cappella and Jamieson 1997; Christen, Kannaovakun, and Gunther 2002; Cook and Gronke 2001; Crawford 2006; Eveland and Shah 2003; Fallows 1996; Giner-Sorolla and Chaiken 1993; Gronke and Cook 2002, 2007; Jamieson 1992; Patterson 1993; Vallone, Ross, and Lepper 1985), hardly any existing scholarship looks at the consequences of these opinions for media persuasion. An exception is Miller and Krosnick (2000), which finds, in a laboratory experiment, that newspaper priming does not occur among those who distrust the media. Another is Druckman (2001), which, also in the laboratory, finds that highly untrustworthy newspapers (such as the *National Inquirer*) cannot produce framing effects. While these findings are suggestive, so far no one has examined media source credibility effects on direct media persuasion or using data from outside the laboratory. As result, we know little about the consequences of the dramatic increase in negativity toward the press over the past 40 years.

This paper investigates how attitudes toward the media as an institution affect how people use the press to form electoral preferences. Considering that potential voters receive most of their information about politics from the news media, examining the voting decision allows me to observe the extent to which citizens rely on their predispositions or are swayed by informative

⁵ As Figures 1 and 2 illustrate, confidence in television manifests a somewhat similar pattern to Confidence in the Press. This is likely because these attitude objects, while different, have some overlap. The main difference is that television may prompt people to think about (and evaluate) entertainment television at least as frequently as news, while the press confidence question directly prompts evaluations of journalism and the news media (see Ladd 2006b).

media messages.⁶ Below, Section 2 discusses two major influences on electoral preferences, *Party Identification* and *Economic Performance*, and presents evidence suggesting both are largely exogenous in the short term. Section 3 lays out a simple voting model incorporating these explanatory variables and derives comparative statics predicting how their effects depend on attitudes toward the press. Sections 4, 5 and 6 test these predictions using a variety of data. Section 7 discusses the implications of these results for polarization and electoral accountability in the American political system. Section 8 briefly concludes.

2 Party Identification and More Contemporary Influences on the Vote

Few political phenomena have been studied more extensively than the individual citizen's *Vote Choice*. While a definitive model of the voting process is still elusive, several empirical regularities are quite robust. First, voters have strong psychological orientations toward the major political parties. Second, despite Party Identification's powerful influence, voters can sometimes be persuaded to vote contrary to their Identification if new information about the relative benefits of competing candidates (typically acquired through mass media) persuades them to do so.

Party identification is generally considered to be the voters' starting point for electoral decision-making (Campbell et al. 1980 [1960] ; Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002; Johnston 2006; Johnston, Hagen, and Jamieson 2004; Miller 1991; Miller and Shanks 1996; Stokes 1966a). When voters confront a new or unfamiliar choice, they tend to rely on their "standing decision" (Key 1961) among the parties (Conover and Feldman 1989; Rahn 1993). As a predisposition, it is a "firm but not immovable attachment" (Campbell et al. 1980 [1960], 148). While new information can change a voter's Party Identification, the effect is small unless the message is very dramatic or

⁶ Ladd (2004; 2006a, ch. 3) presents evidence that attitudes toward the news media affect how people update their beliefs about "valence" issues (Stokes 1966b). However, Ladd (2004; 2006a, ch. 3) only studies beliefs about national conditions, not the formation of preferences for political candidates.

long lasting (Campbell et al. 1980 [1960], 531-535; Cowden and McDermott 2000; Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002; Jennings and Niemi 1981).⁷

The literature also emphasizes the influences of contemporary considerations on voting behavior. The contemporary variable whose effect has been easiest to document is *Economic Performance*. At the aggregate level, voters tend to reward the presidential candidate of the party in the White House when the economy is doing well and punish him or her when the economy is sluggish (Bartels 1992; Bartels and Zaller 2001; Gelman and King 1993; Hibbs 1987, 2000; Lewis-Beck 1990; Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000; Rosenstone 1983). To estimate individual-level effects, some work relies on self-reports of economic perceptions (Fiorina 1981; Kinder and Kiewiet 1979), which could be rationalizations rather than causes of Vote Choice (Achen and Bartels 2003; Kramer 1983; Wilcox and Wlezien 1993), but other work employs more objective (and thus more exogenous) measures. Models using pooled cross-sectional survey data and objective measures of the economy as explanatory variables find a strong relationship between national Economic Performance and individual voting decisions (Markus 1988, 1992; Zaller 2004).

While the evidence that Economic Performance affects Vote Choice is fairly clear, analyses of other contemporary influences outside the laboratory have been counter-intuitively inconclusive (Ansolabehere 2006; Bartels 1992; Holbrook 1994). Ansolabehere (2006, 37) summarizes things succinctly, arguing that, “The inclusion of debates, conventions, and other election related events adds little to the predictive power of economic models [of voting].” One obstacle is the aforementioned endogeneity of cross-sectional survey responses. In addition to economic

⁷ Some scholars have argued that issue opinions and new information have larger and more immediate effects on Party Identification. Models using cross-sectional data produce inconsistent findings on this question (Fiorina 1981; Goldberg 1966; Jackson 1975; Markus and Converse 1979; Miller and Shanks 1996; Page and Jones 1979). However, more powerful research designs, particularly those using panel survey data, have tended to support the claim that Party Identification is more stable and influential than other beliefs and opinions (Gerber and Green 1998; Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002; Jennings and Niemi 1981; Miller 1999). Johnston (2006, 347)’s recent review finds that the preponderance of the literature supports this view, concluding, “Party Identification, at least in the United States and as measured, is a mover but not entirely unmoved.”

perceptions, reported perceptions of candidate personal characteristics and issue positions tend to be rationalizations of Vote Choice (Achen and Bartels 2006; Bartels 2002b; Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954; Brody and Page 1972; Kramer 1983; Lenz 2006b; Page and Brody 1972; Rahn, Krosnick, and Breuning 1994).⁸ Additionally, studies measuring changes in voter preferences during presidential campaigns tend to find the main influence of campaign coverage is to make voters more generally politically knowledgeable (Anderson, Tilley, and Heath 2005) and to make the current state of the economy more salient and influential (Ansolabehere 2006; Bafumi, Gelman, and Park 2004; Bartels 2006; Campbell 2000; Gelman and King 1993; Holbrook 1994). Ansolabehere (2006, 30) calls this the “reinforcement effect.” Thus, while one can’t rule out other campaign media effects, a central way recent media messages influence voters is by sending signals about national Economic Performance.

In summary, current evidence suggests voting decisions are affected by two major factors: long-term party loyalties and more transitory signals about the relative quality of the two parties, the most established being the recent national economy. In this way, predispositions and contemporary information are combined to form a citizen’s Vote Choice. Based on this literature, in the theoretical model and empirical tests below, I assume Economic Performance and Party Identification are, at least in the short term, exogenous influences on Vote Choice.

3 A Simple Model of Electoral Choice

To guide my empirical analysis, I employ (with some refinements in interpretation) Achen’s (1992) simple Bayesian model of voter decision-making, which is consistent with much of the

⁸ Aggregate change in voter preferences during campaigns does seem to respond to prominent campaign events (Bartels 1988; Hillygus and Jackman 2003; Wlezian and Erikson 2002). However, other types of studies showing an increase in the correlation between some survey responses and Vote Choice over the course of a campaign (e.g. Johnston et al. 1992; Johnston, Hagen, and Jamieson 2004) are often less helpful in documenting causation because, except in the case of purely demographic variables, one cannot know whether the campaign increases the influence of certain attributes on Vote Choice or merely increases the amount of voter rationalization (Lenz 2006a, 2006b).

empirical literature on Party Identification and Vote Choice.⁹ While it, like any model, undoubtedly represents a simplification of the psychological processes involved in voter decision-making, it does incorporate the empirical regularities reviewed above: Party Identification provides an initial baseline for candidate choice, but voters can sometimes be swayed from their Identification by contemporary forces like Economic Performance.¹⁰

I represent each voter's initial preference among the candidates as a normal distribution with mean P_{iD} and precision P_{iPID} .¹¹ The voter then receives a message from the news media providing new information about the relative quality of the candidates, such as recent Economic Performance. This message is represented as a normal distribution with mean M_i and precision P_{iM} . The voter then combines her initial candidate preference with the new information to form a final voting preference, which I represent as another normal distribution with mean V_i and precision P_{iV} . The voting decision is related to Party Identification and the media message such that

$$V_i = \frac{P_{iD}P_{iPID} + M_iP_{iM}}{P_{iPID} + P_{iM}}.^{12}$$

In slight contrast to similar models (e.g. Achen 1992; Zechman 1979),

this intends to represent simply the formation of candidate preference in a given election, not

⁹ For example, the model predicts Party Identification's tendency to be inherited from parents and to become more stable as people age (Campbell et al. 1980 [1960]; Franklin and Jackson 1983; Jennings and Niemi 1981). On the empirical validity of the model, see especially Achen (1992, 205-206) and Gerber and Green (1998). As a decision-theoretic, not game theoretic, model, it does not incorporate strategic behavior on the part of voters or an equilibrium concept to make predictions. Voters are purposeful only in that they vote based on their posterior beliefs about the relative quality of the two candidates. This is consistent with Fiorina's (1990; 1996; 2000) argument that, while elites likely behave strategically, the mass public does not. For other examples of using Bayesian models to represent voter learning, see Achen (2002a), Achen and Bartels (2006), Bartels (1993), Calvert (1980; 1986), Calvert and MacKuen (1985), Gerber and Green (1998), Ladd (2004; 2006a) and Zechman (1979). Fiorina (1977; 1981, ch. 4) presents a similar mathematical model of party choice that can be easily adapted to a Bayesian framework (Calvert 1980). For examples of apparent deviations from Bayesian learning by voters, see Bartels (2002a). For an attempt to develop a game theoretic model of media persuasion where media organizations and the mass public behave strategically, see Bovitz et al. (2002). Gill (2002, 89-100) and Gelman et al. (2004, 48-49) present the Bayesian model with normal prior and message (or likelihood) distributions but used as a method of statistical inference rather than simply as decision theory. For work in Bayesian decision theory outside of political science, see Robert (1994), Wald (1950), and Winkler (2003).

¹⁰ As Cameron and Morton (2002, 793) point out, formal models, even when incomplete or stylized, can improve empirical work by serving as "devices for structuring [that] empirical work." While admitting this model is a simplification, I use it to generate specific hypotheses because it is broadly consistent with existing empirical results (Achen 1992) and "at some level, all models are inadequate" (Cameron and Morton 2002, 788). On these points, see also Morton (1999).

¹¹ The precision of a distribution is defined as the inverse of its variance.

¹² The precision of the voter's election preferences is $P_{iV} = P_{iPID} + P_{iM}$.

change in Party Identification itself. Here, I merely postulate that Party Identification is stable in the short term and affects the vote during the campaign by serving as a starting point for the electoral decision. As the most well established contemporary influence on Vote Choice, I use Economic Performance to represent a message transmitted by the news media.¹³ I interpret P_{im} , the perceived precision of the media's message, to be some positive function of the individual's overall evaluation of the news media. Thus, each person's election preference (V_i) is a weighted average of her Party Identification (PID_i) weighted by its precision (P_{iPID}) and the media message she receives about the incumbent party's Economic Performance (M_i) weighted by its precision (P_{im}), which is directly related to her attitude toward the press.

This leads to intuitive predictions regarding the effect of attitudes toward the press on voter decision-making. For interpreting comparative statics, a key point is that both P_{iPID} and P_{im} , because they represent the inverse of the variance of normal distributions, are positive by definition. Thus,

$$\frac{\partial V_i}{\partial PID_i} = \frac{P_{iPID}}{P_{iPID} + P_{im}} > 0 \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{\partial V_i}{\partial M_i} = \frac{P_{im}}{P_{iPID} + P_{im}} > 0, \quad \text{implying Party Identification and Economic}$$

Performance have positive effects on Vote Choice. More significantly, because

$$\frac{\partial(\partial V_i / \partial M_i)}{\partial(P_{im})} = \frac{P_{iPID}}{(P_{iPID} + P_{im})^2} > 0 \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{\partial(\partial V_i / \partial PID_i)}{\partial P_{im}} = \frac{-P_{iPID}}{(P_{iPID} + P_{im})^2} < 0, \quad \text{the effect of Party}$$

Identification on the vote is positively related to P_{im} , while the effect of media messages is negatively related to P_{im} . Thus, the assumption that P_{im} is positively related to one's attitude toward the media leads to the straightforward prediction that when voters dislike the press, their voting

¹³ While I represent the media message as one normal distribution, this could represent (and fully summarize) multiple normally distributed messages about the economy because normal distributions are conjugate to one another.

behavior will be more strongly related to their Party Identification and less strongly related to contemporary messages such as Economic Performance.¹⁴

4 Trust in the Media and Partisan Voting

I test these predictions with survey data from the American National Election Studies (ANES) and the GSS. While both have limitations, they each offer opportunities to test the predictions derived above. The main limitation of the ANES is that it only probes respondents' attitudes toward the media in recent years. *Trust in the Media*, the only question to be asked consistently over time, was measured in the 1996, 1998, 2000 and 2004 time-series surveys.¹⁵ With four congressional elections and three presidential elections, these surveys allow one to test if partisan voting depends on Trust in the Media, but don't include enough variation in national Economic Performance to estimate its effect with interactions. The GSS has conducted national surveys periodically since 1972. In surveys following presidential elections, it asks respondents which candidate they voted for, which party they identify with, and their Confidence in the Press as

¹⁴ Ideally, one might want to parameterize and directly estimate the model, $V_i = \frac{PID_i P_{iPID} + M_i P_{iM}}{P_{iPID} + P_{iM}}$, rather than testing comparative statics. If one could do this, it would account for the fact that while increases in P_{iM} always increase the relationship between Party Identification and Vote Choice and decreased the relationship between a media message and the Vote Choice, its effects on both relationships are nonlinearly conditional on both P_{iPID} and P_{iM} . This can be seen clearly in $\frac{\partial(\partial V_i / \partial M_i)}{\partial(P_{iM})} = \frac{P_{iPID}}{(P_{iPID} + P_{iM})^2}$ and $\frac{\partial(\partial V_i / \partial PID_i)}{\partial P_{iM}} = \frac{-P_{iPID}}{(P_{iPID} + P_{iM})^2}$. Unfortunately, Bayesian learning models are very difficult to identify (Achen 1992; Bartels 1991, 1993). Successfully estimating their parameters through a method like maximum likelihood or nonlinear least squares usually requires one to make very restrictive assumptions about quantities in the model. For example, Bartels (1993) estimates a Bayesian model of voter learning by assuming prior precision is proportional to message precision. Unfortunately, that approach would not work in this case because the goal here is to look particularly at the effect of variation in message precision. Given that direct estimation of this model is not possible, I follow the advice of Cameron and Morton (2002) and Morton (1999) and test comparative statics (see Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green 1995; Silberberg and Suen 2000).

¹⁵ The question asks "How much of the time do you think you can trust the media to report the news fairly? Just about always, most of the time, only some of the time, or almost never?" While not given as an option, "none of the time" is sometimes volunteered as a response, and is coded as if these respondents selected "almost never." Exact question wordings of other ANES variables are available at www.electionstudies.org. All ANES and GSS variable labels are provided in the Appendix.

an institution. These data provide an opportunity to test how attitudes toward the press moderate the effects of both Party Identification and Economic Performance on Vote Choice.¹⁶

Starting with the ANES data, in column 1 of Table 1, I estimate a probit model of presidential voting in 1996, 2000 and 2004, where Vote Choice is a function of Party Identification, Trust in the Media, the interaction between Trust in the Media and Party Identification, and year fixed effects. As expected, the interaction term's coefficient is negative and statistically significant, indicating that greater Trust in the Media reduces the effect of Party Identification

As the model in Section 3 makes clear, when estimating the effect of attitudes toward the press, it is important to control for the certainty of respondents' Party Identification. A variable that serves as a good measure of the certainty of political predispositions is the respondent's level of *Political Knowledge*, determined by a brief battery of objective knowledge questions (Zaller 1992).¹⁷ Also, because the strength of party attachments tends to increase over one's lifetime (Campbell et al. 1980 [1960], 162-163; Converse 1969), *Age* is another way to account for precision of partisanship. In addition, existing scholarship suggests that other forms of political trust like *Trust in Government* and social capital are widely influential political attitudes (Hetherington 1998, 1999, 2004; Hetherington and Globetti 2002; Putnam 2000), which may be correlated with media trust. Consequently, to reduce the danger that omitted variable bias is distorting the results, in column 2 I estimate the model while including Political Knowledge, the interaction between Political Knowledge and Party Identification, Age, the interaction between Age and Party Identification, Trust in Government, the interaction between Trust in Government and Party Identification, *Trust in People* (as a measure of social capital), and the interaction between Trust in

¹⁶ Unfortunately, the GSS surveys do not ask respondents about their congressional votes.

¹⁷ This is also consistent with the notion in the Bayesian framework that the precision of an individual's prior beliefs is equivalent to his or her level of information. As discussed above, while in the model both trust in the media and political information moderate the effect of predispositions nonlinearly, because of data limitations I test only comparative statics and estimate moderating effects linearly.

People and Party Identification as control variables.¹⁸ The interaction between Party Identification and Trust in the Media is largely robust to the inclusion of these controls, remaining negative and statistically significant.¹⁹

Since the sizes of probit coefficients are not directly interpretable, I simulate first differences.²⁰ Setting all other explanatory variables to their means, I estimate (based on column 2 of Table 1) that moving from being a weak Democrat to a weak Republican if one trusts the media “just about always” increases the probability of voting for the Republican candidate by .51 (standard error=.09). In contrast, when someone trusts the news media “just about never,” this shift increases one’s probability of voting Republican by .82 (standard error =.04).

In columns 3 and 4, I estimate the same models, but now predicting Vote Choice for the House of Representatives. Again, the effect of Party Identification is significantly larger when one distrusts the media, a difference that persists when controlling for Political Knowledge, Age, Trust in Government and Trust in People. Based on the model in column 4, again holding all other variables at their means, moving from being a weak Democrat to a weak Republican increases one’s probability of voting for a Republican congressional candidate by .49 (standard error =.05) if one trusts the media “just about always” and by .67 (standard error =.04) if one trusts the media “just about never.” In both presidential and congressional voting, Party Identification’s large effect is notably larger when a voter views the media negatively.

¹⁸ There are many other possible demographic control variables that could possibly be included in this model. On the other hand, some, such as Achen (2002b; 2005) and Clarke (2005), advise against haphazardly including control variables without clear theoretical justification producing “garbage-can regressions and garbage-can probits.” Despite these warnings, I have tested the robustness the results in Table 1 to the inclusion on several additional control variables, including income, gender, and race. The substantive results are unchanged when these variables and their interactions with party identification are included.

¹⁹ Results in Table 1 indicate Trust in Government may moderate the effect of Party Identification in a similar way to Trust in the Media. However, results in Tables 2 and 3 indicate that Trust in Government’s interaction effect is not consistent across different surveys and model specifications.

²⁰ Kam and Franzese (forthcoming) and Brambor et al. (2006) advise interpreting models with interactions by presenting substantively meaningful marginal effects, which is the strategy pursued here. Throughout this paper, I simulate first differences using C.L.A.R.I.F.Y. (King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000; Tomz, Wittenberg, and King 2003). All results are substantively the same if one calculates the effect of moving from strong identification with one party to strong identification with the other, the only difference being that all effects become larger. Results in Table 1 are also substantively the same if I estimate each year separately rather than pooling the data across years.

5 Testing Robustness with Panel Data

In models such as those in Table 1, endogeneity between the explanatory variables and Vote Choice could bias all parameter estimates. To take just one example, attitudes toward the media could be influenced by pre-existing candidate preferences. Endogeneity concerns persist even if one measures explanatory variables in pre-election ANES surveys because they are conducted during the campaign rather than before it (Achen 1992, 208).

Panel surveys measuring explanatory variables several years before the election can help address this problem.²¹ To my knowledge, only two existing multiyear panel surveys include questions about respondents' attitudes toward the media. One is the 1992-1996 ANES panel study, where all relevant explanatory variables are measured in 1994 except Trust in the Media and Trust in People, which are only measured in 1996. While not ideal, in columns 1 and 2 of Table 2, I use these data to model Vote Choice in 1996 as a function of Party Identification, Political Knowledge, Age, and Trust in Government measured in 1994 as well as Trust in the Media measured in 1996.²² The results are inconclusive but highly suggestive. The key coefficient again is the interaction between Party Identification and Trust in the Media. With and without controls, this coefficient is negative, as expected, and similar in magnitude to columns 1 and 2 of Table 1 (and larger than in columns 3 and 4). However, these coefficients' standard errors are much larger than in the Table 1 models, almost certainly resulting from the much smaller sample size. As a consequence, p-values for the interactions are .14 and .35.

While Trust in the Media was not asked prior to 1996, panel respondents who participated in the 1993 ANES pilot study were asked their level of agreement with the statement: "Media

²¹ Panel data have the disadvantage of possibly introducing biases resulting from panel conditioning or panel attrition. While not settling the matter, existing scholarship is reassuring on this point, finding panel effects in the ANES to be small (Bartels 1999).

²² Because Trust in People was not asked prior to the 1996 survey wave, it is not included in the models in Table 2. If Trust in People, measured in 1996, is included in the models in columns 1 through 4 of Table 2, the results are substantively unchanged. Trust in People, measured in 1996, cannot be included in the models in columns 5 and 6 of Table 2 because there is no prior measure of Trust in People with which to instrument its 1996 values.

coverage of politics often reflects the media's own biases more than facts.” Columns 3 and 4 of Table 2 present results from models similar to those in columns 1 and 2, but using this earlier question to measure Trust in the Media. As another alternative specification, columns 5 and 6 show models where all explanatory variables are measured in 1996 but instrumented with their values in earlier panel waves. Instruments are the exact same questions, but asked in 1994, for all variables except Trust in the Media, where the instrument is the 1993 pilot study question.²³ While the models in columns 3 through 6 have the advantage of measuring all explanatory variables several years before the election, sample sizes are less than 350 because they must only include participants in the 1993 ANES pilot study, substantially reducing the precision of all parameter estimates. As a consequence, the results in columns 3 through 6 provide only cautious support for expectations. While the interaction between Party Identification and Trust in the Media has a consistently negative coefficient, standard errors are large enough that the estimates are not significant at conventional levels. In summary, while one must take Table 2’s results with some caution because of limited sample size, Trust in the Media appears to exhibit the same moderating effect on Party Identification if explanatory variables are measured several years before the current election, reducing concern that the results in Table 1 are driven by endogeneity.

A second dataset even better suited for this task is the 2000-2004 ANES panel study. This allows one to model Vote Choice in 2004 while measuring *all* the explanatory variables used in Table 1 several years prior to the election. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 4 present coefficient estimates from models (specified as in previous tables) where all explanatory variables are measured in 2002 except Trust in the Media, which was not asked in 2002 and instead is measured in 2000.²⁴ These

²³ Because the models in columns 5 and 6 of Table 2 and columns 3 and 4 of Table 3 use instrumental variables regression models, these are linear probability models (Aldrich and Nelson 1984) and their coefficients are not directly comparable in size to probit coefficients.

²⁴ The 2002 and 2004 waves did not ask a battery of objective Political Knowledge questions. Instead, I use interviewer ratings of respondents’ “general level of information about politics and public affairs.” In surveys where both are measured, interviewer ratings and respondents’ performance on Knowledge questions tend to be highly

results are even more consistent with expectations than those in previous tables. The interaction between Party Identification and Trust in the Media is negative, larger than in any of the previous models, and statistically significant despite a sample size of less than 700. Simulating first differences (based on column 2 of Table 3) with all other variables set to their means, moving from being a weak Democrat to a weak Republican increases one's probability of voting Republican by a statistically insignificant .17 (standard error =.19) if one trusts the media "just about always" and by .51 (standard error =.23) if one trusts the media "just about never." Models in columns 3 and 4 are analogous to those in columns 1 and 2 except that each explanatory variable is measured in 2004 and instrumented with the same survey question from a previous wave of the panel. These results are again consistent with expectations, though in the model with all controls the interaction between Party Identification and Trust in the Media is marginally statistically significant ($p=.16$). Thus, all specifications in Table 3 produce very similar substantive findings.

To summarize, the effect of Trust in the Media on partisan voting is always consistent with expectations and often quite large. Although the use of panel data reduces the sample size considerably, sometimes preventing results from reaching statistical significance, the size and direction of the effect is robust even when the explanatory variables are measured several years prior to the campaign. This at least partially relieves concerns that the results in Table 1 are driven by endogeneity.

6 Confidence in the Press, Party Identification, and Economic Voting

As noted above, while the ANES data utilized here have virtues, one weakness is that they cover too few elections to even attempt to include variation in national Economic Performance as an explanatory variable. Fortunately, because the GSS has been asking respondents to report their confidence in the press since 1972, I can use the first GSS survey conducted after each presidential

correlated (Zaller 1985). For that reason, interviewer ratings are often used as substitutes, when Knowledge questions are not available (e.g. Bartels 1996).

election²⁵ to test not only how Confidence in the Press moderates the effect of partisan predispositions, but also cautiously testing how Confidence moderates the effect of Economic Performance. A disadvantage is that all of these surveys lack a panel component, preventing one from measuring explanatory variables prior to the election campaign. A second disadvantage is that, even though the GSS spans more elections than any other survey probing attitudes toward the media, it still only includes eight. With essentially only eight observations for the Economic Performance variable, one has very limited statistical power to estimate its effect with interactions.

Column 1 of Table 4 shows results from a probit model testing how Confidence in the Press moderates the effect of Party Identification in the GSS data.²⁶ As above, the negative coefficient on the interaction between Party Identification and Confidence in the Press indicates that Party Identification is more influential among those with less Confidence in the Press. The model in column 2 estimates this interaction with control variables. As the GSS does not include a direct measure of Political Knowledge, I use respondents' years of *Education* along with Age as measures of the certainty of partisan predispositions. The GSS also does not include questions probing general Trust in Government or Trust in People in all these surveys.²⁷ To account for Trust in Government, I control for *Confidence in the Executive Branch* and its interaction with Party identification.²⁸ While including these controls reduces the magnitude of the interaction between Confidence in the Press and Party Identification somewhat, it is still negative and statistically significant. Simulating first differences with other variables at their means (based on column 2 of

²⁵ The 1984 presidential election is excluded because the GSS survey following this election did not probe respondents' Confidence in the Press.

²⁶ This specification is directly analogous to those in columns 1 and 3 of Tables 1, columns 1, 3 and 5 of Table 2 and columns 1 and 3 of Table 3. All the models in Table 4 are similar to those in previous Tables with some necessary differences. Rather than being coded 1 for a Republican vote and 0 for a Democratic vote, the Vote Choice variable is coded 1 for a vote for the incumbent party's candidate and 0 for a vote for the opposition party's candidate. Party Identification is also recoded so that higher values indicate greater identification with the incumbent president's party.

²⁷ In GSS surveys after five of the seven elections (1972, 1988, 1992, 1996, and 2000), the GSS does probe respondents' Trust in People. If one estimates the model in column 1 on data from only these five years and includes Trust in People and the interaction between Party Identification and Trust in people, the interaction between Party Identification and Confidence in the Press still has a large statistically significant negative coefficient.

²⁸ The results are substantively unchanged if one instead uses *Confidence in Congress*.

Table 4), moving from weakly identifying with the opposition party to weakly identifying with the president's party increases one's probability of voting for the incumbent party's presidential candidate by .53 (standard error =.07) if one has "a great deal" of Confidence in the Press and by .75 (standard error =.02) if one has "hardly any" Confidence in the Press. While the difference is smaller than in the ANES data, likely resulting from different question wordings, here again the effect of Party Identification is significantly larger among those with negative attitudes toward the press.

The models in columns 3 through 6 of Table 4 test how Confidence in the Press moderates the effect of Economic Performance on the Vote Choice. As noted above, this puts a heavy strain on the data because objective economic conditions are the same for all respondents in a given election and thus this variable only takes on eight different values.²⁹ One needs to estimate the effect of Economic Performance and at least one highly collinear interaction term with only eight observations of this variable. Consequently, results should be viewed with some caution. Consistent with previous studies of economic voting (Bartels and Zaller 2001; Hibbs 2000; Markus 1988, 1992; Zaller 2004), I measure national Economic Performance with the percentage change in real disposable income per capita, as reported by the Bureau of Economic Analysis of the United States Department of Commerce.

As a baseline, column 3 of Table 4 shows results of a probit model where presidential Vote Choice is a function of Party Identification, Confidence in the Press and Economic Performance in the first three quarters of the election year.³⁰ As expected, Economic Performance and Party

²⁹ Assigning all voters in a given year a certain value on the Economic Performance variable creates econometric complications because the disturbances will be clustered in each year, producing downwardly biased standard errors (Snijders and Bosker 1999; Steenbergen and Jones 2002). I adjust my standard errors in the models in columns 3 through 6 of Table 4 to account for this clustering. An alternative approach to measuring Economic Performance this way would be to use respondents' own perceptions of the economy. However, as discussed in Section 2, these are as likely to be rationalizations of Vote Choice as causes of it.

³⁰ Achen and Bartels (2004) find that, when real disposable income growth per capita during these 3 quarters is controlled for, income growth in no other quarter of the presidential term has any discernable effect on the outcome of the next presidential election. This is also consistent with Hibbs (2000) analysis, which estimates weights on Economic

Identification are both significant predictors of Vote Choice. With other variables set to their means, moving from the worst Economic Performance (-1.2 % growth 1980) to the best Economic Performance (6.8 % growth in 1984) in the dataset increases the probability of voting for the incumbent party's candidate by .11 (standard error = .07, $p = .099$). Column 4 tests how Confidence in the Press moderates Economic Performance's influence by including the interaction between these two variables. The initial results are inconclusive. Consistent with expectations, the interaction term's coefficient is positive, indicating confidence in the press increases receptivity to economic messages, but less than half the size of its standard error.

To investigate this relationship in more detail, an alternative specification would be, following Achen and Bartels (2004), to measure Economic Performance in different quarters separately. The model in column 5 estimates separately the effects of Economic Performance in the first two quarters and in the third quarter of the election year. The results suggest both affect Vote Choice, although the effect of third quarter Economic Performance is more than twice as large.³¹ The model in column 6 tests how Confidence in the Press moderates both these economic effects. These results illuminate why the column 4 model was inconclusive. The effect of first and second quarter Economic Performance does not depend on respondents' Confidence in the press. Its coefficient is the same size as in column 5 and the coefficient on its interaction with Confidence in the Press is insignificant and very small.³² In contrast, the effect of third quarter Economic Performance does depend on respondents' Confidence in the Press. The coefficient on the

Performance at different times during the presidential term and finds only Economic Performance during the election year is influential. Annualized Economic Performance is calculated as $\Delta RDI = (400/n) * [\ln(RDI_t) - \ln(RDI_{t-n})]$, where t is the last quarter of the time period whose Economic Performance is being calculated and n is the number of quarters in the time period (see Achen and Bartels 2004, 8).

³¹ This contrasts somewhat with Achen and Bartels (2004), who find, using aggregate data with voting returns going back to the end of World War II as the dependent variable, that the first two quarters have a somewhat larger effect than the third.

³² If one estimates the effect of Economic Performance in the first two quarters separately and the interactions between both of these variables and confidence in the press, both interaction coefficients are negative and not significant.

interaction between third quarter Economic Performance and Confidence in the Press is positive and statistically significant. Again using first differences to illustrate the effect, moving from the worst third quarter Economic Performance in the dataset (2.5 % growth 1980) to the best (7.2% growth in 1972) increases one's probability of voting for the incumbent party's candidate by .11 (standard error = .02) if one has "a great deal" of Confidence in the Press and by an insignificant .04 (standard error = .04) if one has "hardly any" Confidence in the Press. Those with more Confidence in the Press are more responsive to informative economic messages, at least when those messages come in the last quarter before the election. Ideally, as in column 2 of this table and in Tables 1 through 4 above, one would want to include numerous control variables to test the robustness of this finding. Unfortunately, with only eight elections, there is simply not enough data to estimate additional interaction terms with any precision.³³ Consequently, while these results are consistent with expectations outlined in Section 3, they should be considered suggestive, but not entirely conclusive.

In summary, analyses of pooled GSS data are generally supportive of expectations and (when applicable) consistent with the analyses of ANES data above. In the GSS, those with more negative attitudes toward the news media rely more on their partisan predispositions to make voting decisions. In addition, while the data in this area are more strained and thus conclusions more cautious, the effect of recent economic conditions also appears to depend on attitudes toward the media.

7 Discussion

Results from a variety of datasets and model specifications all support the predictions put forth in Section 3. They suggest attitudes toward the news media change the weight given to two of

³³ When additional control variables with interaction terms (such as Education and Confidence in the Executive Branch) are included in the model, all the standard errors become very large. As noted above, there is simply not enough information in these data to estimate so many interaction terms. Achen and Bartels (2004) include a variable measuring of the number of years the incumbent party has held office in their model of presidential Vote Choice. All the results in Table 4 are substantively unchanged if this is included in the models.

the most important influences on Americans' voting decisions. Those with more negative attitudes toward the media base their political choices more on their partisan predispositions and resist new information about the economy.

What are the broader implications for the American political system? While public attitudes toward the media have become more negative over the past 40 years (Cook and Gronke 2001; Cook, Gronke, and Rattliff 2000; Gronke and Cook 2002, 2007), the relationship between Party Identification and Vote Choice has increased (Bartels 2000; Miller 1991). Figure 2 illustrates these two simultaneous trends. On the right vertical axis, graphed with a dashed line, are probit coefficients reflecting the relationship between Party Identification and presidential Vote Choice in the GSS for each election since 1972.³⁴ The results are very similar to those produced by Bartels (2000) using ANES data and a somewhat different statistical procedure. It shows the relationship between Party Identification and Vote Choice has increased substantially since the early 1970s. Simulating first differences, changing from weak identification with the opposition party to weak identification with the incumbent president's party increases one's chances of voting for the incumbent's party by .59 (standard error = .02) in the 1972 election and by .78 (standard error = .01) in the 2004 election. On the left vertical axis and graphed with a solid line is the average Confidence in the Press in the GSS over these same years. Over this same period, average Confidence in the Press (on a 0-1 scale) declined from .54 after the 1972 election to .35 after the 2004 election.

Considering less Confidence in the Press tends to induce more partisan voting, one can estimate how much of the increase in partisan voting since 1972 can be accounted for by the decline in public Confidence in the Press. To calculate this, I simulate (based on column 2 of Table 4)

³⁴ In all models in this section, like those in Section 6, Vote Choice is coded so that 1 indicates a vote for the incumbent party's candidate and Party Identification is coded such that 1 indicates strong identification with the incumbent president's party. The results in Figure 2 are substantively the same if Vote Choice and Party Identification are coded so that 1 indicates a Republican Vote or Republican Identification. Both the decline in Confidence in the Press and the increase in the effect of party attachments on voting over time are statistically significant.

taking 1972 voters and adjusting their Confidence in the Press downward to 2000 levels and calculate the resulting change in the effect of Party Identification. Dividing this by the increase in the effect of partisanship between 1972 and 2004 indicates that about 48% of that increase could be accounted for by the decline in Confidence in the Press.³⁵ While more negative public attitudes toward the media can explain only a portion of this trend,³⁶ it is one cause of a phenomenon—increasing polarization in the electorate—with potentially serious consequences.

The notion that the electorate rewards and punishes political leaders based on their performance is often thought to be a central meritorious feature of democratic systems of government (Downs 1957; Fiorina 1981; Key 1968). Retrospective voting has the potential both to elect higher quality politicians (reducing “adverse selection”) (Banks and Duggan 2001; Morton 2006) and give those elected incentives to serve citizens’ interests (reducing “moral hazard”) (Austen-Smith and Banks 1989; Banks and Sundaram 1993; Fearon 1999; Ferejohn 1986; Morton 2006). As the electorate becomes more inclined to ignore information it receives and vote based on predispositions, the actions of politicians have fewer consequences on Election Day, potentially reducing the quality of representation. Thus, increasingly negative attitudes toward the press and other causes of electoral rigidity and polarization are matters of concern for those interested in the quality of democratic governance.

³⁵ Using Confidence in the Press as a measure of respondents’ attitudes toward the media potentially underestimates the portion of the increase in partisan voting that can be explained by public animosity toward the press because Confidence in the Press has a smaller moderating effect on partisan voting than the ANES’s Trust in the Media question. Comparisons are made using the marginal effects of moving from weakly identifying with the opposition party (a party identification score of .167) to weakly identifying with the incumbent party (a party identification score of .833). This marginal effect increases by .195 (from .589 to .784) between 1972 and 2004. I then calculate the marginal effect of the same movement of Party Identification, based on the model in column 2 of Table 4, when all explanatory variables are set to their 1972 means and year fixed effects are set to 1972. Next, I calculate this same marginal effect with Confidence in the Press at its mean in 2004, year fixed effects set to 2004, and all other variables still at their 1972 means. The difference between these two marginal effects is .093. I then divide .093 by .195 (the increase in the marginal effect of Party Identification between 1972 and 2004). If one uses this same procedure, but makes all comparisons using the marginal effect of moving the full length of the Party Identification variable (from strongly identifying with the opposition party to strongly identifying with the incumbent party) the decrease in Confidence in the Press accounts for 51.5% of the increase in the effect of Party Identification between 1972 and 2004.

³⁶ The remainder of the increase in partisan voting may result from, among other things, more extreme candidates, more polarized congressional voting, or more income inequality (Fiorina 2002; Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope 2005; Hetherington 2001; McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006).

8 Conclusion

While existing research investigates possible causes of increasingly negative public attitudes toward the news media, we have a limited understanding of the consequences of this trend. Using a simple Bayesian voting model, I predict those with negative attitudes toward the press will rely less on new information and more on partisan predispositions when forming voting preferences. I test this prediction with recent cross-sectional and panel data from the ANES and over time pooled cross-sectional data from the GSS. The results consistently support expectations. Voters who dislike the news media are more influenced by their party identification and appear less influenced by recent economic conditions. As a consequence, the increasing negativity of public opinion toward the news media over the past 40 years has been an important contributor to the growing polarization of the American political system.

Table 1: Partisan Voting and Trust in the Media in the ANES

	Presidential Vote		Congressional Vote	
Party Identification	4.49** (0.25)	4.62** (0.49)	2.97** (0.17)	3.25** (0.36)
Party Identification X Trust in the Media	-1.40** (0.46)	-1.13** (0.49)	-0.90** (0.33)	-0.83** (0.35)
Trust in the Media	0.07 (0.27)	-0.09 (0.28)	0.21 (0.19)	0.09 (0.20)
Party Identification X Political Knowledge		0.35 (0.36)		0.17 (0.26)
Political Knowledge		-0.19 (0.21)		-0.10 (0.16)
Party Identification X Age		0.11 (0.65)		-0.31 (0.48)
Age		0.36 (0.37)		0.42 (0.27)
Party Identification X Trust in Government		-1.30** (0.60)		-0.53 (0.44)
Trust in Government		0.84** (0.34)		0.47* (0.25)
Party Identification X Trust in People		0.38* (0.22)		0.03 (0.16)
Trust in People		-0.29** (0.13)		0.16* (0.09)
1998			0.06 (0.08)	0.02 (0.08)
2000	0.31** (0.08)	0.31** (0.09)	-0.13* (0.07)	-0.19** (0.08)
2004	0.29** (0.08)	0.31** (0.09)	-0.28** (0.07)	-0.29** (0.08)
Constant	-2.22** (0.16)	-2.53** (0.28)	-1.22** (0.11)	-1.62** (0.21)
Pseudo R ²	0.55	0.55	0.32	0.33
Log Likelihood	-922.9	-910.6	-1499.4	-1474.9
<i>n</i>	2944	2918	3192	3160

Entries are probit coefficients with standard errors in parenthesis. Models use pooled data from ANES time-series surveys conducted in 1996, 2000, and 2004 for the presidential vote models and those conducted in 1996, 1998, 2000, and 2004 for the congressional vote models. The same patterns appear when data from each year are analyzed separately.

**p<.05, *p<.10 for two-tailed hypothesis tests.

Table 2: Checking Robustness using 1994-1996 ANES Panel Data

	All Explanatory Variables Measured in 1994 except Trust in the Media Measured in 1996		All Explanatory Variables Measured in 1994 except Trust in the Media Measured in 1993		1996 Explanatory Variables Instrumented by Values in Earlier Waves	
Party Identification	4.12** (0.63)	4.24** (1.01)	3.64** (0.37)	4.79** (1.52)	1.84** (0.52)	2.90 (2.04)
Party Identification X Trust in the Media	-1.51^a (1.03)	-1.00 (1.07)	-0.89 (0.98)	-0.62 (1.03)	-1.53^b (0.98)	-2.66 (3.42)
Trust in the Media	-0.57 (0.66)	-0.64 (0.67)	-0.09 (0.66)	-0.20 (0.70)	0.24 (0.54)	0.57 (1.30)
Party Identification X Political Knowledge		1.44** (0.70)		0.27 (1.40)		-1.25 (2.50)
Political Knowledge		-0.75* (0.42)		0.23 (0.90)		0.90 (1.56)
Party Identification X Age		-1.30 (1.09)		-1.81 (1.75)		-0.35 (0.60)
Age		1.31* (0.72)		1.69 (1.22)		0.30 (0.26)
Party Identification X Trust in Government		-1.84* (1.09)		-1.35 (2.03)		1.70 (4.40)
Trust in Government		0.40 (0.69)		-0.64 (1.30)		-0.19 (0.64)
Constant	-1.61** (0.41)	-1.89** (0.65)	-2.06** (0.26)	-2.83** (1.03)	-0.20 (0.33)	-1.19 (1.40)
Pseudo R ²	0.48	0.49	0.49	0.50		
Log Likelihood	-295.3	-281.9	-122.7	-118.2		
R ²					0.60	0.42
Standard Error of Regression					0.32	0.39
<i>n</i>	827	806	349	346	348	335

All models use data from the 1992-1996 ANES Panel Study with 1996 presidential Vote Choice as the dependent variable. Columns 1 through 4 present probit coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. In columns 1 and 2, all explanatory variables are measured in 1994 except Trust in the Media, which was not asked until 1996 and is measured in that year. If Trust in People (asked first in 1996) and its interaction with Party Identification are included in the models in columns 1 through 4, the results are substantively unchanged. In the models in columns 3 and 4, all explanatory variables are measured in 1994 except Trust in the Media, which is measured with a question in the 1993 ANES pilot study asking respondents if media coverage reflects facts or bias (see the Appendix for variable information). Columns 5 and 6 present instrumental variables regression coefficients with Huber-White robust standard errors in parentheses, with all explanatory variables measured in 1996 and all but Trust in the Media instrumented with their 1994 values. Trust in the Media is instrumented with the aforementioned media question from the 1993 pilot study.

**p<.05, *p<.10, ^a p=.14, ^b p=.12 for two-tailed hypothesis tests.

Table 3: Checking Robustness using 2000-2004 ANES Panel Data

	Probit Model with Explanatory Variables Measured in Prior Panel Waves		Instrumental Variables Model with Explanatory Variables Instrumented with their Values in Prior Panel Waves	
Party Identification	5.69** (0.64)	4.81** (1.56)	1.45** (0.20)	0.96^c (0.67)
Party Identification X Trust in the Media	-3.34** (1.03)	-4.03** (1.13)	-0.77** (0.39)	-0.77^c (0.55)
Trust in the Media	0.61 (0.54)	0.82 (0.58)	0.28 (0.32)	0.18 (0.43)
Party Identification X Political Knowledge		-0.85 (1.25)		0.28 (0.77)
Political Knowledge		-0.06 (0.66)		-0.13 (0.35)
Party Identification X Age		2.00 (1.66)		0.44 (0.28)
Age		-1.81** (0.92)		-0.25* (0.17)
Party Identification X Trust in Government		1.88 (1.37)		0.23^c (0.50)
Trust in Government		-0.30 (0.73)		0.05 (0.37)
Party Identification X Trust in People		-0.22 (0.53)		-0.17 (0.17)
Trust in People		-0.05 (0.28)		0.05 (0.09)
Constant	-2.14** (0.33)	-1.06** (0.80)	-0.15 (0.17)	0.09 (0.34)
Pseudo R ²	0.56	0.57		
Log Likelihood	-201.2	-183.6		
R ²			0.62	0.61
Standard Error of Regression			0.31	0.31
<i>n</i>	660	617	653	607

All models use data from the 2000-2004 ANES Panel Study with 2004 presidential Vote Choice as the dependent variable. Columns 1 and 2 present probit coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. In these models, all explanatory variables are measured in 2002 except Trust in the Media, which was not asked in 2002 and is instead measured in 2000. Columns 3 and 4 present instrumental variables regression coefficients with Huber-White robust standard errors in parentheses. In these models, all explanatory variables are measured in 2004 and instrumented with their values in earlier panel waves. Instruments for all explanatory variables except Trust in the Media are measured in 2002. As Trust in the Media was not asked in 2002 or 2004, media evaluations are measured with 2004 media thermometer ratings instrumented with 2000 Trust in the Media.

**p<.05, *p<.10, ^c p≤.16 for two-tailed hypothesis tests.


Table 4: Partisan and Economic Voting and Confidence in the Press in the GSS

	Probit Models with Pooled Cross-Sectional GSS Data					
Party Identification	3.55** (0.18)	2.96** (0.40)	3.18** (0.14)	3.18** (0.14)	3.19** (0.13)	3.19** (0.13)
Party Identification X Confidence in the Press	-0.65** (0.17)	-0.48** (0.17)				
Confidence in the Press	0.18** (0.08)	0.08 (0.10)	-0.03 (0.13)	-0.15 (0.23)	-0.11 (0.10)	-0.40** (0.20)
Party Identification X Education		1.54** (0.32)				
Education		-0.90** (0.29)				
Party Identification X Age		-0.09 (0.35)				
Age		-0.02 (0.33)				
Party Identification X Confidence in Executive Branch		-0.80** (0.29)				
Confidence in Executive Branch		0.61** (0.31)				
Economic Performance Q1–Q3			0.08* (0.04)	0.06 (0.07)		
Economic Performance Q1–Q3 X Confidence in the Press				0.05 (0.09)		
Economic Performance Q1–Q2					0.04 (0.03)	0.04 (0.05)
Economic Performance Q1–Q2 X Confidence in the Press						0.003 (0.05)
Economic Performance Q3					0.09** (0.03)	0.04 (0.05)
Economic Performance Q3 X Confidence in the Press						0.10* (0.06)
Constant	-1.05** (0.06)	-0.76** (0.37)	-1.60** (0.07)	-1.55** (0.11)	-1.74** (0.07)	-1.60** (0.15)
Pseudo R ²	0.42	0.43	0.40	0.40	0.41	0.41
Log Likelihood	-2765.6	-2684.3	-2835.5	-2834.6	-2811.1	-2805.8
<i>n</i>	6874	6769	6874	6874	6874	6874

The models in columns 1 and 2 include year fixed effects whose coefficients are not reported. Entries for all models are probit coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All models adjust standard errors to account for clustering of disturbances by year. The annualized rate of growth in Real Disposable Income (RDI) is calculated based on quarterly RDI data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis of the United States Department of Commerce and available at <http://www.bea.gov>. All other variables are from the 1973, 1977, 1982, 1989, 1993, 1998, 2002 and 2006 GSS Surveys. See the Appendix for variable labels. The 1984 presidential election is excluded because the 1985 GSS survey, which asked respondents their 1984 presidential vote, did not also probe their Confidence in the Press.

**p<.05, *p<.10 for two-tailed hypothesis tests.

Figure 1: Change in Confidence in American Institutions from 1973 to 2006




Confidence in Institutions Coding

A Great Deal	1
Only Some	0.5
Hardly Any	0

Source: 1973 and 2006 General Social Surveys (GSS). Observations are weighted to account for the unequal probability of inclusion in the sample. Table includes all institutions where confidence was asked in both the 1973 and 2006 surveys

Figure 2: Partisan Voting and Confidence in the Press over Time



Source: 1973, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978, 1980, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2002 2004, and 2006 GSS Surveys. Observations are weighted to account for the unequal probability of inclusion in the sample.

Appendix

Variables from ANES 1948-2004 Cumulative File: *Vote Choice* – VCF0704a; *Party Identification* – VCF0301; *Trust in the Media* – VCF0675; *Trust in Government* – VCF0604; *Trust in People* – VCF0619; *Age* – VCF0101; *Political Knowledge* (variables from time series survey datasets merged into the cumulative file) – V961189, V961190, V961191, V961192, V980475, V980476, V980477, V980478, V001447, V001450, V001453, V001456, V045162, V045163, V045164, V045165.

Variables from ANES 1992-1996 Panel Study File: *Vote Choice* – V961082; *Party Identification* – V940655, V960420; *Trust in the Media* – V937307, V961339; *Trust in Government* – V941033, V960566; *Age* – V941203, V960605; *Political Knowledge* – V941006, V941007, V941008, V941009, V941010, V941011, V961189, V961190, V961191, V961191.

Variables from ANES 2000-2004 Panel Study File: *Vote Choice* – P045003a; *Party Identification* – P023038x, P045058x; *Trust in the Media* – P001429, P045041; *Trust in Government* – P025174, P045149; *Trust in People* – P025101, P045158; *Age* – P023126X, P045193; *Political Knowledge* – P023155, P045202.

Variables from GSS 1972-2004 Cumulative File: *Vote Choice* – PRES72, PRES76, PRES80, PRES88, PRES92, PRES96, PRES00, PRES04; *Party Identification* – PARTYID; *Confidence in the Press* – CONPRESS; *Age* – AGE; *Education* – EDUC.

References

- Achen, Christopher H. 1982. *Interpreting and Using Regression*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications.
- Achen, Christopher H. 1992. "Social Psychology, Demographic Variables and Linear Regression: Breaking the Iron Triangle in Voting Research." *Political Behavior* 14 (3): 195-211.
- Achen, Christopher H. 2002a. "Parental Socialization and Rational Party Identification." *Political Behavior* 24 (2): 151-170.
- Achen, Christopher H. 2002b. "Toward a New Political Methodology: Microfoundations and A.R.T." *Annual Review of Political Science* 5: 423-450.
- Achen, Christopher H. 2005. "Let's Put Garbage-Can Regressions and Garbage-Can Probits Where They Belong." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 22 (4): 327- 339.
- Achen, Christopher H., and Larry M. Bartels. 2003. "Ross Perot as a Flash Party: Catch-All Grievance Coalitions and Democratic Stability." Paper presented at Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL.
- Achen, Christopher H., and Larry M. Bartels. 2004. "Musical Chairs: Pocketbook Voting and the Limits of Democratic Accountability." Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, IL.
- Achen, Christopher H., and Larry M. Bartels. 2006. "It Feels Like We're Thinking: The Rationalizing Voter and Electoral Democracy." Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, PA.
- Aldrich, John H., and Forrest D. Nelson. 1984. *Linear Probability, Logit, and Probit Models*: Sage University Press.
- Anderson, Robert, James Tilley, and Anthony F. Heath. 2005. "Political Knowledge and Enlightened Preferences: Party Choice through the Electoral Cycle." *British Journal of Political Science* 35 (2): 285-302.
- Ansolabehere, Stephen. 2006. "The Paradox of Minimal Effects." In *Capturing Campaign Effects*, ed. Henry E. Brady and Richard Johnston. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 29-44.
- Austen-Smith, David, and Jeffrey S. Banks. 1989. "Electoral Accountability and Incumbency." In *Models of Strategic Choice in Politics*, ed. Peter C. Ordeshook. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 121-148.
- Bafumi, Joseph, Andrew Gelman, and David K. Park. 2004. "What Does 'Do Campaigns Matter?' Mean?" Columbia University. Typescript.
- Banks, Jeffrey S., and John Duggan. 2001. "A Multidimensional Model of Repeated Elections." University of Rochester. Typescript.

- Banks, Jeffrey S., and Rangaragan K. Sundaram. 1993. "Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection in a Model of Repeated Elections." In *Political Economy: Institutions, Competition, and Representation*, ed. William A. Barnett, Norman Schofield and Melvin Hinich. New York: Cambridge University Press, 295-311.
- Bartels, Larry M. 1988. *Presidential Primaries and the Dynamics of Public Choice*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Bartels, Larry M. 1991. "Messages Received." Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Society for Political Methodology, Duke University, Durham, NC.
- Bartels, Larry M. 1992. "The Impact of Electioneering in the United States." In *Electioneering: A Comparative Study of Continuity and Change*, ed. David Butler and Austin Ranney. New York: Clarendon Press and Oxford University Press, 244-277.
- Bartels, Larry M. 1993. "Messages Received." *American Political Science Review* 87 (2): 267-285.
- Bartels, Larry M. 1996. "Uninformed Votes." *American Journal of Political Science* 40 (1): 194-230.
- Bartels, Larry M. 1999. "Panel Effects in the American National Election Studies." *Political Analysis* 8 (1): 1-20.
- Bartels, Larry M. 2000. "Partisanship and Voting Behavior, 1952-1996." *American Journal of Political Science* 44 (1): 35-50.
- Bartels, Larry M. 2002a. "Beyond the Running Tally." *Political Behavior* 24 (2): 117-150.
- Bartels, Larry M. 2002b. "The Impact of Candidate Traits in American Presidential Elections." In *Leaders' Personalities and the Outcomes of Democratic Elections*, ed. Anthony King. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 44-68.
- Bartels, Larry M. 2006. "Priming and Persuasion in Presidential Campaigns." In *Capturing Campaign Effects*, ed. Henry E. Brady and Richard Johnston. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 78-112.
- Bartels, Larry M., and John Zaller. 2001. "Presidential Vote Models: A Recount." *PS: Political Science & Politics* 34 (1): 8-20.
- Bennett, Stephen Earl, Staci L. Rhine, and Richard S. Flickinger. 2001. "Assessing Americans' Opinions About the News Media's Fairness in 1996 and 1998." *Political Communication* 18 (2): 163-182.
- Berelson, Bernard, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and William N. McPhee. 1954. *Voting: A Study of Opinion Formation in a Presidential Campaign*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Bovitz, Gregory L., James N. Druckman, and Arthur Lupia. 2002. "When Can a News Organization Lead Public Opinion? Ideology Versus Market Forces in Decisions to Make News." *Public Choice* 113 (1-2): 127-155.

- Brambor, Thomas, William Roberts Clark, and Matt Golder. 2006. "Understanding Interaction Models: Improving Empirical Analysis." *Political Analysis* 14 (1): 63-82.
- Brody, Richard A., and Benjamin I. Page. 1972. "Comment: The Assessment of Policy Voting." *American Political Science Review* 66 (2): 450-458.
- Calvert, Randall L. 1980. "The Role of Imperfect Information in Electoral Politics." Ph.D. dissertation. California Institute of Technology.
- Calvert, Randall L. 1986. *Models of Imperfect Information in Politics*. Chur, Switzerland: Harwood Academic Publishers.
- Calvert, Randall, and Michael B. MacKuen. 1985. "Bayesian Learning and the Dynamics of Public Opinion." Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL.
- Cameron, Charles M., and Rebecca Morton. 2002. "Formal Theory Meets Data." In *Political Science: The State of the Discipline*, ed. Helen V. Milner and Ira Katznelson. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 784-804.
- Campbell, Angus, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes. 1980 [1960]. *The American Voter*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, Midway Reprint.
- Campbell, James E. 2000. *American Campaign: U.S. Presidential Campaigns and the National Vote*. College Station: Texas A&M University Press.
- Cappella, Joseph N., and Kathleen Hall Jamieson. 1997. *Spiral of Cynicism*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Chaiken, Shelly. 1980. "Heuristic Versus Systematic Information Processing and the Use of Source Versus Message Cues and Persuasion." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 39 (5): 752-766.
- Christen, Cindy T., Prathana Kannaovakun, and Albert C. Gunther. 2002. "Hostile Media Perceptions: Partisan Assessments of Press and Public During the 1997 United Parcel Service Strike." *Political Communication* 19 (4): 423-436.
- Clarke, Kevin A. 2005. "The Phantom Menace: Omitted Variable Bias in Econometric Research." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 22 (4): 341-352.
- Conover, Pamela Johnston, and Stanley Feldman. 1989. "Candidate Perception in an Ambiguous World: Campaigns, Cues and Inference Processes." *American Journal of Political Science* 33 (4): 912-940.
- Converse, Philip E. 1964. "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics." In *Ideology and Discontent*, ed. David E. Apter. New York: Free Press, 206-261.
- Converse, Philip E. 1969. "Of Time and Partisan Stability." *Comparative Political Studies* 2 (2): 139-171.

- Cook, Timothy E., and Paul Gronke. 2001. "Dimensions of Institutional Trust: How Distinct Is Public Confidence in the Media?" Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL.
- Cook, Timothy E., Paul Gronke, and John Rattliff. 2000. "Disdaining the Media: The American Public's Changing Attitudes toward the News." Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC.
- Cowden, Jonathan A., and Rose M. McDermott. 2000. "Short-Term Forces and Partisanship." *Political Behavior* 22 (3): 197-222.
- Crawford, Craig. 2006. *Attack the Messenger: How Politicians Turn You against the Media*. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Crawford, Vincent, and Joel Sobel. 1982. "Strategic Information Transmission." *Econometrica* 50 (6): 1431-51.
- DellaVigna, Stefano, and Ethan Kaplan. 2007. "The Fox News Effect: Media Bias and Voting." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 122 (3): 1187-1234.
- Delli Carpini, Michael X., and Scott Keeter. 1996. *What Americans Know About Politics and Why It Matters*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Downs, Anthony. 1957. *An Economic Theory of Democracy*. New York: Harper.
- Druckman, James N. 2001. "On the Limits of Framing Effects: Who Can Frame?" *Journal of Politics* 63 (4): 1041-1066.
- Druckman, James N., and Arthur Lupia. 2000. "Preference Formation." *Annual Review of Political Science* 3: 1-24.
- Druckman, James N., and Michael Parkin. 2005. "The Impact of Media Bias." *Journal of Politics* 67 (4): 1030-1142.
- Eagly, Alice H., and Shelley Chaiken. 1993. *The Psychology of Attitudes*. New York: Harcourt College Publishers.
- Erskine, Hazel. 1970-1971. "The Polls: Opinion of the News Media." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 34 (4): 630-643.
- Eveland, William P., and Dhavan V. Shah. 2003. "The Impact of Individual and Interpersonal Factors on Perceived News Media Bias." *Political Psychology* 24 (1): 101-117.
- Fallows, James. 1996. *Breaking the News: How the Media Undermine American Democracy*. New York: Pantheon.
- Fearon, James. 1999. "Electoral Accountability and the Control of Politicians: Selecting Good Types Versus Sanctioning Poor Performance." In *Democracy, Accountability, and Representation*, ed. Susan C. Stokes Adam Przeworski, and Bernard Manin. New York: Cambridge University Press, 55-96.

- Ferejohn, John. 1986. "Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control." *Public Choice* 50 (1): 5-25.
- Fineman, Howard. 2005. "The 'Media Party' Is Over." *MSNBC.com*. 13 January. <http://msnbc.msn.com/id/6813945/> (Accessed: 1 February 2007).
- Fiorina, Morris P. 1977. "An Outline for a Model of Party Choice." *American Journal of Political Science* 21 (3): 601-625.
- Fiorina, Morris P. 1981. *Retrospective Voting in American National Elections*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Fiorina, Morris P. 1990. "Information and Rationality in Elections." In *Information and Democratic Processes*, ed. John Ferejohn and James H. Kuklinski. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 329-342.
- Fiorina, Morris P. 1996. "Rational Choice, Empirical Contributions, and the Scientific Enterprise." In *The Rational Choice Controversy*, ed. Jeffrey Friedman. New Haven: Yale University Press, 85-94.
- Fiorina, Morris P. 2000. "When Stakes Are High, Rationality Kicks In," *New York Times*, 26 February, A15-17.
- Fiorina, Morris P. 2002. "Parties and Partisanship: A 40-Year Retrospective." *Political Behavior* 24 (2): 93-115.
- Fiorina, Morris P., Samuel J. Abrams, and Jeremy C. Pope. 2005. *Culture War? The Myth of a Polarized America*. 2nd ed. New York: Pearson Longman.
- Franklin, Charles H., and John E. Jackson. 1983. "The Dynamics of Party Identification." *American Political Science Review* 77 (4): 957-973.
- Gabel, Matthew, and Kenneth Scheve. 2007. "Estimating the Effect of Elite Communications on Public Opinion Using Instrumental Variables." *American Journal of Political Science* 51 (4): 1013-1028.
- Gelman, Andrew, John B. Carlin, Hal S. Stern, and Donald B. Rubin. 2004. *Bayesian Data Analysis*. 2nd ed. New York: Chapman & Hall.
- Gelman, Andrew, and Gary King. 1993. "Why Are American Presidential Election Campaign Polls So Variable When Votes Are So Predictable?" *British Journal of Political Science* 23 (1): 409-451.
- Gerber, Alan, and Donald P. Green. 1998. "Rational Learning and Partisan Attitudes." *American Journal of Political Science* 42 (3): 794-818.
- Gerber, Alan, Dean Karlan, and Daniel Bergan. 2006. "Does the Media Matter? A Field Experiment Measuring the Effect of Newspapers on Voting Behavior and Political Opinions." Yale University. Typescript.
- Gill, Jeff. 2002. *Bayesian Methods: A Social and Behavioral Sciences Approach*. New York: Chapman & Hall.

- Giner-Sorolla, Roger, and Shelley Chaiken. 1993. "The Causes of Hostile Media Judgments." *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* 30 (1): 165-180.
- Goldberg, Arthur S. 1966. "Discerning a Causal Pattern among Data on Voting Behavior." *American Journal of Political Science* 60 (4): 913-922.
- Graber, Doris A., eds. 2006. *Media Power in Politics*. 5th ed. Washington, DC: CQ Press.
- Graber, Doris A. 2007. *Mass Media and American Politics*. 7th ed. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press.
- Green, Donald P., Bradley Palmquist, and Eric Schickler. 2002. *Partisan Hearts and Minds: Political Parties and the Social Identity of Voters*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Gronke, Paul, and Timothy E. Cook. 2002. "Disdaining the Media in the Post 9/11 World." Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, MA.
- Gronke, Paul, and Timothy E. Cook. 2007. "Disdaining the Media: The American Public's Changing Attitudes toward the News." *Political Communication* 24 (3): 259-281.
- Hetherington, Marc J. 1996. "The Media's Role in Forming Voters' National Economic Evaluations in 1992." *American Journal of Political Science* 40 (2): 372-395.
- Hetherington, Marc J. 1998. "The Political Relevance of Political Trust." *American Political Science Review* 92 (4): 791-808.
- Hetherington, Marc J. 1999. "The Effect of Political Trust on the Presidential Vote, 1968-96." *American Political Science Review* 93 (2): 311-326.
- Hetherington, Marc J. 2001. "Resurgent Mass Partisanship: The Role of Elite Polarization." *American Political Science Review* 95 (3): 619-631.
- Hetherington, Marc J. 2004. *Why Trust Matters: Declining Political Trust and the Demise of American Liberalism*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Hetherington, Marc J., and Suzanne Globetti. 2002. "Political Trust and Racial Policy Preferences." *American Journal of Political Science* 46 (2): 253-275.
- Hibbs, Douglas A. 1987. *The American Political Economy: Macroeconomics and Electoral Politics*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Hibbs, Douglas A. 2000. "Bread and Peace Voting in U.S. Presidential Elections." *Public Choice* 104 (1-2): 149-180.
- Hillygus, D. Sunshine, and Simon Jackman. 2003. "Voter Decision Making in Election 2000: Campaign Effects, Partisan Activation, and the Clinton Legacy." *American Journal of Political Science* 47 (4): 583-596.
- Holbrook, Thomas M. 1994. "Campaigns, National Conditions, and U.S. Presidential Elections." *American Journal of Political Science* 38 (4): 973-998.

- Jackson, John. E. 1975. "Issues, Party Choices, and Presidential Votes." *American Journal of Political Science* 19 (2): 161-185.
- Jamieson, Kathleen Hall. 1992. *Dirty Politics: Deception, Distraction, and Democracy*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Jennings, M. Kent, and Richard G. Niemi. 1981. *Generations and Politics: A Panel Study of Young Adults and Their Parents*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Johnston, Richard. 2006. "Party Identification: Unmoved Mover or Sum of Preferences?" *Annual Review of Political Science* 9: 329-351.
- Johnston, Richard, Andre Blais, Henry Brady, and Jean Crete. 1992. *Letting the People Decide: Dynamics of a Canadian Election*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Johnston, Richard, Michael G. Hagen, and Kathleen Hall Jamieson. 2004. *The 2000 Presidential Election and the Foundations of Party Politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Kahn, Kim Fridkin, and Patrick J. Kenney. 2002. "The Slant of the News: How Editorial Endorsements Influence Campaign Coverage and Citizens' Views of Candidates." *American Political Science Review* 96 (2): 381-394.
- Kam, Cindy D., and Robert J. Franzese, Jr. forthcoming. *Modeling and Interpreting Interactive Hypotheses in Regression Analysis*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Key, V. O. 1961. *Public Opinion and American Democracy*. New York: Knopf.
- Key, V. O. 1968. *The Responsible Electorate: Rationality in Presidential Voting, 1936-1960*. New York: Vintage Books.
- Kinder, Donald R. 1998a. "Communication and Opinion." *Annual Review of Political Science* 1: 167-197.
- Kinder, Donald R. 1998b. "Opinion and Action in the Realm of Politics." In *The Handbook of Social Psychology*, ed. Daniel Todd Gilbert, Susan T. Fiske and Gardner Lindzey. New York: McGraw-Hill, 778-866.
- Kinder, Donald R. 2003. "Communication and Politics in the Age of Information." In *Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology*, ed. David O. Sears, Leonie Huddy and Robert Jervis. New York: Oxford University Press, 357-393.
- Kinder, Donald R., and D. Roderick Kiewiet. 1979. "Sociotropic Politics: The American Case." *British Journal of Political Science* 11 (2): 129-161.
- King, Gary, Michael Tomz, and Jason Wittenberg. 2000. "Making the Most of Statistical Analysis: Improving Interpretation and Presentation." *American Journal of Political Science* 44 (2): 341-355.
- Klapper, Joseph. 1960. *The Effects of Mass Communication*. Glencoe, IL: Free Press.

- Kramer, Gerald H. 1983. "The Ecological Fallacy Revisited: Aggregate Versus Individual-Level Findings on Economics and Elections, and Sociotropic Voting." *American Political Science Review* 77 (1): 92-111.
- Ladd, Jonathan. 2004. "Attitudes toward the News Media and the Acquisition of Political Information." Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL.
- Ladd, Jonathan. 2006a. "Attitudes toward the News Media and Political Competition in America." Ph.D. dissertation. Department of Politics, Princeton University.
- Ladd, Jonathan McDonald. 2006b. "What Does Trust in the Media Measure?" Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, PA.
- Lenz, Gabriel. 2006a. "Learning, Not Priming: Reconsidering the Evidence for the Priming Hypothesis." Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Typescript.
- Lenz, Gabriel. 2006b. "What Politics Is About." Ph.D. dissertation. Department of Politics, Princeton University.
- Lewis-Beck, Michael S. 1990. *Economics and Elections: The Major Western Democracies*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Lewis-Beck, Michael S., and Mary Stegmaier. 2000. "Economic Determinants of Electoral Outcomes." *Annual Review of Political Science* 3: 183-219.
- Lippmann, Walter. 1997 [1922]. *Public Opinion*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Lupia, Arthur. 1994. "Shortcuts Versus Encyclopedias: Information and Voting Behavior in California Insurance Reform Elections." *American Political Science Review* 88 (1): 63-76.
- Lupia, Arthur, and Mathew D. McCubbins. 1998. *The Democratic Dilemma: Can Citizens Learn What They Need to Know?* New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Markus, Gregory B. 1988. "The Impact of Personal and National Economic Conditions on the Presidential Vote: A Pooled Cross-Sectional Analysis." *American Journal of Political Science* 32 (1): 137-154.
- Markus, Gregory B. 1992. "The Impact of Personal and National Economic Conditions on Presidential Voting, 1956-1988." *American Journal of Political Science* 36 (3): 829-834.
- Markus, Gregory B., and Philip E. Converse. 1979. "A Dynamic Simultaneous Equation Model of Electoral Choice." *American Political Science Review* 73 (4): 1055-1070.
- Mas-Colell, Andreu, Michael D. Whinston, and Jerry R. Green. 1995. *Microeconomic Theory*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- McCarty, Nolan, Keith T. Poole, and Howard Rosenthal. 2006. *Polarized America: The Dance of Ideology and Unequal Riches*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

- McGuire, William J. 1969. "The Nature of Attitudes and Attitude Change." In *Handbook of Social Psychology*, ed. G. Lindzey and E. Aronson. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 136-314.
- Miller, Joanne M., and Jon A. Krosnick. 2000. "News Media Impact on the Ingredients of Presidential Evaluations: Politically Knowledgeable Citizens Are Guided by a Trusted Source." *American Journal of Political Science* 44 (2): 301-315.
- Miller, Warren E. 1991. "Party Identification, Realignment, and Party Voting: Back to the Basics." *American Political Science Review* 85 (2): 557-568.
- Miller, Warren E. 1999. "Temporal Order and Causal Inference." *Political Analysis* 8 (2): 119-140.
- Miller, Warren E., and J. Merrill Shanks. 1996. *The New American Voter*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Morton, Rebecca B. 1999. *Methods and Models: A Guide to the Empirical Analysis of Formal Models in Political Science*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Morton, Rebecca B. 2006. *Analyzing Elections*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.
- Mutz, Diana C. 1998. *Impersonal Influence: How Perceptions of Mass Collectives Affect Political Attitudes*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Page, Benjamin I., and Richard A. Brody. 1972. "Policy Voting and the Electoral Process: The Vietnam War Issue." *American Political Science Review* 66 (3): 979-995.
- Page, Benjamin I., and Calvin C. Jones. 1979. "Reciprocal Effects of Policy Preferences, Party Loyalties and the Vote." *American Political Science Review* 73 (4): 1071-1089.
- Patterson, Thomas E. 1993. *Out of Order*. New York: Knopf.
- Patterson, Thomas E., and Robert D. McClure. 1976. *The Unseeing Eye: The Myth of Television Power in National Politics*. New York: Putnam.
- Petrocik, John R. 1995. "Reporting Campaigns: Reforming the Press." In *Campaigns and Elections American Style*, ed. James A. Thurber and Candice J. Nelson. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 126-137.
- Petty, Richard. E., and John. T. Cacioppo. 1986. *Communication and Persuasion: Central and Peripheral Routes to Attitude Change*. New York: Springer-Verlag.
- Popkin, Samuel L. 1991. *The Reasoning Voter: Communication and Persuasion in Presidential Campaigns*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Putnam, Robert D. 2000. *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Rahn, Wendy M. 1993. "The Role of Partisan Stereotypes in Information Processing About Political Candidates." *American Journal of Political Science* 37 (2): 472-496.

- Rahn, Wendy M., Jon A. Krosnick, and Marijke Breuning. 1994. "Rationalization and Derivation Processes in Survey Studies of Political Candidate Evaluation." *American Journal of Political Science* 38 (3): 582-600.
- Robert, Christian P. 1994. *The Bayesian Choice: A Decision-Theoretic Motivation*. New York: Springer-Verlag.
- Rosenstone, Steven J. 1983. *Forecasting Presidential Elections*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Silberberg, Eugene, and Wing Suen. 2000. *The Structure of Economics: A Mathematical Analysis*. 3rd ed. New York: McGraw-Hill / Irwin.
- Sniderman, Paul M., Richard A. Brody, and Philip Tetlock. 1991. *Reasoning and Choice: Explorations in Political Psychology*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Snijders, Tom A. B., and Roel Bosker. 1999. *Multilevel Analysis: An Introduction to Basic and Advanced Multilevel Modeling*. London: Sage Publications.
- Steenbergen, Marco R., and Bradford S. Jones. 2002. "Modeling Multilevel Data Structures." *American Journal of Political Science* 26 (1): 218-237.
- Stokes, Donald E. 1966a. "Party Loyalty and the Likelihood of Deviating Elections." In *Elections and the Political Order*, ed. Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes. New York: Wiley, 125-135.
- Stokes, Donald E. 1966b. "Spatial Models of Party Competition." In *Elections and the Political Order*, ed. Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes. New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc.
- Tomz, Michael, Jason Wittenberg, and Gary King. 2003. "C.L.A.R.I.F.Y.: Software for Interpreting and Presenting Statistical Results." Version 2.1. Stanford University, University of Wisconsin, and Harvard University, <http://gking.harvard.edu>.
- Vallone, Robert P., Lee Ross, and Mark R. Lepper. 1985. "The Hostile Media Phenomenon: Biased Perception and Perceptions of Media Bias in Coverage of the Beirut Massacre." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 49 (3): 577-585.
- Wald, Abraham. 1950. *Statistical Decision Functions*. New York: Wiley.
- Wilcox, Nathaniel, and Christopher Wlezien. 1993. "The Contamination of Responses to Survey Items: Economic Perceptions and Political Judgments." *Political Analysis* 5: 181-213.
- Winkler, Robert L. 2003. *An Introduction to Bayesian Inference and Decision*. 2nd ed. Sugar Land, TX: Probabilistic Publishing.
- Wlezian, Christopher, and Robert S. Erikson. 2002. "The Timeline of Presidential Election Campaigns." *Journal of Politics* 64 (4): 969-993.
- Zaller, John R. 1985. "Pre-Testing Information Items on the 1986 N.E.S. Pilot Survey." Report to the National Election Studies Board of Overseers.

- Zaller, John R. 1992. *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Zaller, John R. 1996. "The Myth of Massive Media Impact Revived." In *Political Persuasion and Attitude Change*, ed. Diana C. Mutz, Paul M. Sniderman and Richard A. Brody. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 17-78.
- Zaller, John R. 2004. "Floating Voters in U.S. Presidential Elections, 1948-2000." In *Studies in Public Opinion: Attitudes, Nonattitudes, Measurement Error, and Change*, ed. Willem Saris and Paul M. Sniderman. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 166-212.
- Zaller, John R., and Stanley Feldman. 1992. "A Simple Theory of Survey Response: Answering Questions Versus Revealing Preferences." *American Journal of Political Science* 36 (3): 579-616.
- Zechman, Martin J. 1979. "Dynamic Models of the Voter's Decision Calculus." *Public Choice* 34 (3-4): 297-315.