Due date: April 30, handed in electronically by midnight Eastern Time.
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Aquinas thinks that one commits the sin of "morose delectation" when one's reason either makes oneself feel "unlawful passions", say "when a man deliberately provokes himself to a movement of anger, or of lust", or when "it fails to check the unlawful movement of a passion; for instance, when a man, having deliberately considered that a rising movement of passion is inordinate [i.e., inappropriate from the point of view of the purpose of this passion], continues, notwithstanding, to dwell upon it, and fails to drive it away" (Summa Theologica, I-II, 74, 6).
(1) Can one ever act immorally solely by thinking or feeling a certain way if one does not express the thought in any way in external action? (2) Conversely, can someone ever be morally praiseworthy just for thinking or feeling in some way? Justify your answers. Does consistency require the same answer to both questions? If you answer one of these questions in the positive, give an account of the kinds of thoughts or feelings that are like that. In answering this question, you should think about at least two of the following moral theories: Aristotle, Kant and/or utilitarianism (if you've covered utilitarianism in another class; if not, you can read about it at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consequentialism/).
Tucker thinks that polygyny benefits some classes of people and harms others. Which ones are benefited and harmed according to him? Do you think he is right in his judgment? Is a polygynous arrangement compatible with (a) the equality between men and women and (b) a joint identity between lovers? What kinds of insights into polygyny does the film Leila (you must watch Leila to write on this) present you with? Could one rationally accept polygyny while rejecting polyandry or vice versa?
What does Dworkin think treating someone as an object or as a sex object is. Support your claims with quotations. Which of her definitions is the best? Could you improve the definition? Given this definition, does it follow that objectification is always wrong? Why or why not? Does the production of pornography objectify women? If so, which women (the models or others or all)? Does consumption of pornography objectify women? Make sure you make use of both Nussbaum's and your own ideas in this paper.
Why do people tend to think there is such a thing as perversion (don’t limit yourself just to sexual perversion)? We looked at some accounts of sexual perversion. Which of these theories is the best one? Why? (You don’t need to go into an in-depth examination of the other theories.) Do you think the theory is true? If not, could it be improved on, or is the concept of sexual perversion hopelessly flawed? If there were a viable concept of perversion, do you think it would be wrong to engage in sexually perverted activity? Why or why not?
Contraception, homosexuality, etc. Several authors, including George and Bradley, Pruss and Grisez and Finnis (discussed in lecture, not read) think that acts such as contraceptive sex, homosexual activity, masturbation, bestiality, etc. are of a piece: the main reason each is wrong is also a reason why all the others are wrong. Choose one of the sources, and explain why according to that source all of these acts are wrong. How might one try to refute this argument? Could your refutation be responded to, and if so, how? (Note: If you discuss issues of infertility, you need to take into account what was said in lecture or read in the George and Bradley piece about this issue.)
How does Levin define "normalcy" in general (not just in the case of same-sex activity)? Is this a good definition? He thinks that by his definition homosexuality is abnormal. Is he right about that? Why or why not? (Be critical, even if you end up agreeing with him.) Is there a difference in the answer to this question depending whether "homosexuality" refers to an orientation (a tendency to feel only same-sex sexual desire) or to acts (orgasmic acts between persons of the same sex). If you think his definition of "normalcy" is a bad one, then you have another question to answer: Is homosexuality (in either or each sense) abnormal by a better definition of "abnormalcy" and what would that definition be?
Corvino argues that homosexual activity achieves the same goods that heterosexual activity by an infertile couple does, and hence is permissible. What are these goods? Is he right that these are achieved in both cases, and that no others are achieved in the infertile heterosexual case? Corvino's argument requires some principle roughly like: "Any activity which promotes these goods is morally acceptable". What exact formulation of this principle does his argument use? E.g., does he need to say that literally any activity that promotes these goods is morally acceptable, or maybe any activity that promotes these goods and avoids evils (which kinds of evils? we do not want circularity here) is acceptable, or...? Is this principle true? Why or why not? (Here you should consider whether there are any potential counterexamples to the principle that any activity that promotes these goods is morally acceptable, e.g., cases of infertile incest.) How would George and Bradley respond to Corvino's argument? Who would be right and why?